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Public Interest Considerations in European Merger Control Regimes 
 
Oliver Budzinski# & Annika Stöhr*+ 
 
Abstract: Nowadays, merger control predominantly relies upon a strict analysis of 
the effects from merger and acquisitions on effective competition. However, there 
is scope for so-called public interest considerations in several European merger con-
trol regimes and recently a number of European politicians have called for more 
elbowroom for non-competition-oriented interventions into merger control. For 
instance, they did so in the context of the prohibition of the Siemens-Alstom-
merger and the upcoming industrial policy discussion about European Champions. 
Since the social welfare effects of competitive markets present an important public 
interest in itself, additional public interest considerations justifying an intervention 
need to be non-market in the sense that these goals stand in conflict with competi-
tion. However, a trade-off between effective competition and public interest, i.e. 
public interests that are better served through market power then through effective 
competition, is a rare phenomenon. This paper gives an overview of public interest 
considerations in the merger policy of European Union member states and analyzes 
four jurisdictions in more detail. We find that the institutional designs how public 
interests considerations are included in the merger control regimes lack focus on 
non-market public interest considerations across the analyzed jurisdictions. Fur-
thermore, there are relevant shortcomings regarding transparency and legal cer-
tainty. Moreover, our ex-pots analysis shows that the empirical record of past pub-
lic interest-motivated interventions is questionable with only few interventions 
yielding the desired effects. Therefore, we suggest revising the public interest regu-
lations in the respective merger control regulations by narrowing their focus to real 
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non-market public interests and by levying decision power on less politically-
influenced bodies.  
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1. Introduction 
Protecting and safeguarding market competition as the principal coordination 
mechanism of supply and demand serves the public interest. Coordinating econom-
ic activities through competitive markets provides a superior solution to the fun-
damental problem of scarcity than any other mechanisms known so far.1 Conse-
quently, market competition generates more social welfare than any alternative 
coordination mechanism. Notwithstanding, there may be additional public interests 
that may stand in conflict with market competition. Some of them may require ad-
ditional policy tools adjusting market results according to these goals, like for in-
stance in the case of income redistribution through taxes and social services. In 
these cases, having effectively competitive markets as a starting point is still benefi-
cial for public interest. In rare cases, however, a social goal may be better achieved 
through the natural opposite of competition, i.e. through market power, than 
through competition. We will call such goals non-market public interest. If there is 
a trade-off between effective competition and public interest (i.e. public interests 
that are better served through market power then through effective competition), 
then a democratic society must be allowed to value the conflicting goal higher than 
the welfare effects of effective competition (in this special area), given the decision 
process is made under awareness of the welfare costs of pursuing the conflicting 
public interest. Therefore, it cannot be denied that there may be scope for correct-
ing purely competition-based decisions on non-market public interest grounds. 
Note, however, that in the real world, vested interests may hide behind ostensible 
                                                          
1  The theories of market failure do stand in contrast to this general wisdom. The term market 
“failure”, for instance through serious externalities or massive and strategically-exploitable 
asymmetric information, is somewhat misleading since it “only” implies that markets do not 
achieve the perfect level of social welfare all alone. Intelligent institutions (as rules of the game) 
and smart interventions may improve social welfare in these cases. Notwithstanding, the market 
does not “fail”; it still produces superior results to alternative coordination mechanisms. Note al-
so that only ingeniously-designed interventions may improve welfare here; real-world interven-
tions, distorted by imperfect political and administrative processes and influenced by lobbyism, 
may actually perform worse than the imperfect market. Thus, the theories of market failure are 
rather theories of market imperfections and do not represent cases where less competition serves 
the public interest better than more competition. This is even true for the extreme case of posi-
tive externalities called public goods in economics. The rare cases where users of a non-rival good 
cannot be excluded from consumption because of inherent goods characteristics imply the ne-
cessity for the public to enforce payment of users in order to avoid widespread free rider prob-
lems – but notwithstanding a competitive market still serves welfare better than a monopoly or 
bureaucratic administration.  
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public interests in order to protect and/or create non-competitive rents – at the ex-
pense of society. In an imperfect world, the identification problem of real public 
interest versus ostensible public interest is likely to be considerable given the imper-
fections of political and administrative processes and the power of lobbyism.  
Merger control represents a particular relevant field of competition policy where 
these types of public interest considerations play a role. Competition authorities 
analyse mergers and acquisitions with respect to their effects on competition. The 
goal of merger control is to protect competition through blocking combinations of 
companies that substantially or significantly lessen competition in the affected 
markets. However, in exceptional cases, non-market public interest considerations 
may justify to allow for anticompetitive concentration if two conditions are ful-
filled: (i) the non-market public interests outweigh the public interest of having 
competitive markets and (ii) the anticompetitive merger is instrumental for achiev-
ing the respective non-market public interest goal. While the public interest-based 
clearance of an anticompetitive concentration (i.e. a merger or an acquisition that 
was blocked by the antitrust authority because it lessens/impedes competition) is 
the dominant case, it is also conceivable that a procompetitive merger gets chal-
lenged on non-market public interest grounds. Here, antitrust authorities would 
allow the merger because of a lack of significant anticompetitive effects and/or 
considerable efficiency advantages, whereas non-market public interest considera-
tions advocate blocking the merger.2 
The topic of public interest considerations in merger control recently received re-
newed attention in the context of the European’s Commission decision to block the 
merger between Siemens and Alstom (European Commission 2019). Politicians 
from the home countries of the two companies cried out and eventually a “Franco-
German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century” was 
published (BMWi 2019). Here the German and French Ministers for Economic Af-
fairs, among different regulatory and other changes, suggest an appellation right 
for the European Council, so that it can override merger prohibitions by the Euro-
                                                          
2  Note that this type of overruling competition-effects-based merger control decisions has nothing 
to do with enforcement problems of merger control authorities against anticompetitive mergers 
(inter alia, Budzinski 2010) or with legal appeal or revision (inter alia, Pappas & Demortain 2004; 
Barbier de la Serre 2006). 
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pean Commission on the grounds of public interest considerations. This proposal 
would extend an already long list of public interest considerations and exceptions 
in European merger control regimes like, for instance, in the British Merger Assess-
ment Guidelines, the German Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen; GWB), and the French Code de Commerce. Public 
interest aspects in merger control regimes include securing jobs, supplying goods 
such as energy and medical care, or preserving the free press. Obviously, however, 
some of these public interest considerations clearly do not match our definition of 
non-market public, as they do not trade-off with effective competition.  
This contribution aims to give an overview on public interest considerations in Eu-
ropean merger control regimes by taking a deeper look into German merger con-
trol, where the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs may allow a merger deemed to 
be anticompetitive by the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) on public interest grounds 
(so-called ministerial approval; “Ministererlaubnis”). We answer the research ques-
tions (i) whether the public interests stipulated in the respective competition laws 
are non-market in nature, and (ii) if, in anecdotally chosen cases, the respective 
permitted anticompetitive mergers were instrumental to achieve the stated non-
market public interest goals. For the German case study, we (iii) provide an over-
view whether the postulated public interest goals have ex-post been promoted by 
the past case of ministerial exemptions. We conclude that the ways public interests 
are currently included in merger control regime in Europe are deficient, in particular 
because they are not restricted to non-market public interests and the institutional 
design offers ample scope for political and lobbyistic influence, pretending to fol-
low public interest when actually vested interests are pursued. 
 
2. Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control 
In the European Union, merger control takes place on the European level (based 
upon EU law with the European Commission as the competition authority) as well 
as on the member state level (based upon national law enforced by national com-
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petition laws). Additionally, member states can also directly apply European law.3 
Under strict conditions, member states have the possibility to consider public inter-
ests when applying EU law by the provisions of Article 21 EUMR. Public security, 
plurality of the media and prudential rules are seen as prima facie legitimate to 
constitute exceptions for the otherwise exclusive consideration of competitive as-
pects, whereas the European Commission (EC) may decide case-by-case if other 
public interest aspects can ex-ante be applied in a given merger case (OECD 2016b: 
6).  
The different member states of the EU design their merger control regimes individ-
ually and can therefore decide whether they include public interest considerations 
or not. If they do, they can shape their regulations differently, e.g. in terms of sec-
tors covered, consequences of a successful application of public interest considera-
tions in a merger case, or the decisive body that is allowed to clear or prohibit a 
merger based on public interests. Table 1 gives an overview of the 28 EU member 
states and the different ways of including public interest considerations into their 
merger control. Shown are all states in which the respective public interest aspects 
are actually included in competition law – besides that, there are several states that 
include public interest considerations on single case level, which have no explicit 
legal basis. That makes a deeper investigation of the instruments and the reasons 
behind the usage difficult and, in tendency, inaccurate. Thus, they are not included 
in table 1 and will not be analysed in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Public Interest Considerations in EU Merger Control Regimes 
Country Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control 
Austria - Applied in merger cases in the media industry, here the merger 
is to be blocked if it is likely to decrease media plurality (§13 
KartG) 
- So-called “Federal Cartel Prosecutor” to represent public inter-
ests in important cases or industries (§75 KartG) 
Belgium - None 
Bulgaria - None 
Croatia - None 
                                                          
3  See for questions of competence allocation and delineation Budzinski & Christiansen (2005) and 
Budzinski (2006, 2018). 
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Republic of Cyprus - None 
Czech Republic - None 
Denmark - None  
Estonia - None 
Finland  - Electricity market has special thresholds: total volume of electric-
ity distributed at 400V or number of electricity plants belonging 
to the merging parties amounts to over 25% of the national 
electricity grid post-merger - intervention in mergers does not 
require that a significant impediment to effective competition 
can be demonstrated (Section 25 of the Finnish Competition 
Act) 
France - Minister for Economic Affairs has power to evoke a case for rea-
sons of general interest other than maintaining competition, in 
particular industrial development, competitiveness of undertak-
ings relative to international competition, or crea-
tion/maintenance of jobs (Article L. 430 - 7 - 1 Code de Com-
merce)  
Germany - Minister of Economic Affairs can clear a blocked merger based 
on specified public interest considerations (competitiveness of 
undertakings relative to international competition, macroeco-
nomic advantages, or outstanding interest of the general public) 
after the Bundeskartellamt has blocked it solely based on com-
petition aspects (§42 GWB) 
Greece - None  
Hungary - Merger that helps to preserve jobs or to assure security of supply 
can be claimed to be of strategic importance at the national lev-
el (Article 24/A of the Competition Act)  
Ireland - Special rules for mergers in the media sector (section 23 of the 
Competition Act) 
Italy - Italian Competition Authority (ICA) can exceptionally allow an 
otherwise prohibited merger if relevant national economic inter-
ests are involved (Article 25 (1) of Law No. 287/90)  
- After clearance by the ICA, Italian Prime Minister can prohibit the 
acquisition of an Italian company by a foreign firm if in the for-
eign country Italian undertakings are discriminated, especially in 
connection with the ability of Italian firms to acquire local com-
panies (Article 25 (2) of Law No. 287/90)  
- ICA can clear an anticompetitive merger in the banking sector to 
protect the economic stability of one or more parties involved in 
the merger (Article 25 (5-bis) of Law No. 287/90) 
- When reviewing mergers involving insurance companies,  ICA 
has to consult the responsible sector regulator IVASS before 
making a decision (Article 25 of Law No. 287/90)   
Latvia - None  
Lithuania - None 
Luxembourg - None 
Malta - None 
Netherlands - Minister of Economic Affairs can clear a blocked merger based 
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on not specified public interest considerations (Article 47 of the 
Dutch Competition Act)   
Poland - None 
Portugal - Regulatory Authority for the Media can intervene to protect 
freedom and pluralism of the media (Article 4B of the Portu-
guese Television Act)  
- Government (Council of Ministers) can intervene based on fun-
damental strategic interests of the national economy (Article 41 
of the 2014 PCA’s By-laws) 
Romania - None  
Slovakia - None 
Slovenia - None 
Spain - Council of Ministers can clear a prohibited merger regarding 
public interests other than protecting competition (Article 10 of 
the Competition Act 15/2007): 
o defence and national security, 
o protection of public security or public health, 
o free movement of goods and services within the national 
territory, 
o environment protection, 
o promotion of technological research and development, 
o guarantee of adequate maintenance of the objectives of 
sectorial regulation 
Sweden  - None 
United Kingdom  - Secretary of State can issue an intervention notice to the Mo-
nopolies and Merger Commission (MMC) if he considers one or 
more of the following public interest aspects to be present in a 
particular merger review process: national security, media plural-
ity, stability of the UK financial system (section 58 of the Enter-
prise Act); these specified considerations apply to three types of 
mergers: public interest mergers, special public interest mergers, 
European relevant merger situations (Enterprise Act 2002)  
 
For a deeper analysis, we choose four European countries where public interest 
considerations are included in the respective competition law. We describe public 
interest aspects in the Austrian, German, French and UK Merger control. To ensure 
comparability of our analysis, we examine the different merger control regimes un-
der the same comparative values: (i) we first check if the respective regime stipu-
lates truly non-market public interests following our definition in the introduction. 
Secondly (ii), we analyse the instruments with regard to their transparency and the 
legal certainty for all parties involved. In a third and fourth step, we (iii) look into 
the frequency of the actual usage of the instruments and (iv) evaluate anecdotally if 
the decisions to allow anticompetitive concentration actually promoted public in-
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terest. In this step, we analyse if the anticompetitive merger was instrumental to 
reach the respective non-market public interest goals. The last step (v) is a final 
evaluation of the respective instrument in terms of asking if it is, in its current form, 
suitable to include important non-market aspects into merger control decisions.  
 
2.1 Public Interest Considerations in Austrian Merger Control 
In Austrian merger legislation, public interests have to be taken into account re-
garding media mergers. Besides anticompetitive effects, media mergers can also 
have negative effects in terms of decreasing media plurality and increasing media 
bias. If a merger between media companies is likely to decrease media plurality, it is 
to be prohibited (§13 KartG). Media plurality is defined by the Austrian competition 
law as “a variety of independent media companies, which are not related to each 
other within the meaning of §7 KartG and by which a media coverage of different 
opinions is ensured” (§13 (2) KartG). Hence, media plurality is not only about a 
wide variety of titles; instead, independent coverage has to be ensured through a 
respective ownership structure (Bundeskanzleramt 2019). Higher concentration in 
this market, therefore, can be seen as a threat to media plurality - which shows 
that protection of competition and public interest considerations are not mutually 
exclusive here, but act in the same direction. 
Besides the application of public interests in media mergers there is another partic-
ularity in Austrian merger control: the so-called “Bundeskartellanwalt” (Federal Car-
tel Prosecutor, FCP), whose role was implemented in Austrian merger control in 
2002 (Beirat für Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen 2010). His main task is “the repre-
sentation of public interests in matters of competition law at the Higher Regional 
Court of Vienna as a cartel court” (§75 KartG). What constitutes public interests in 
the context of this law, however, is not defined in detail. The FCP can file an appli-
cation for the opening of a case. Furthermore, he can be a party to antitrust pro-
ceedings in which he is not an applicant (Bundesministerium Verfassung, Re-
formen, Deregulierung und Justiz 2019).  
An evaluation of the two particularities of the Austrian merger control regime re-
garding our five criteria yields the following insights: 
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(i) Non-Market Public Interests: 
The analysis of the Austrian merger control needs to be divided into its two 
different parts: the special regulation of media mergers and the institution 
FCP. Media plurality, minimization of media bias, and independent media 
coverage could be seen as non-market public interest reasons for otherwise 
anticompetitive mergers if market-powerful media companies experience 
less incentives to bias news than media firms facing intensive competition 
(Mullainathan & Shleifer 2005). However, under empirically realistic condi-
tions like imperfect information, information asymmetries, and the presence 
of politically-motivated media entrepreneurs, effective competition among 
media companies serves the goals of media plurality, minimization of media 
bias, and independent news coverage better than narrow oligopolies or a 
powerful monopoly (Coase 1974; Gentzkow & Shapiro 2006, 2008; Ander-
son & McLaren 2012). Consequently, these goals can be better achieved 
through competition than through concentration. Furthermore, the defini-
tion of media plurality used by the Austrian competition authorities makes 
media plurality dependent on the ownership structure and, thus, to a large 
extent on the competitive conditions on the market. For these reasons, me-
dia plurality cannot be seen as a non-market public interest and market 
power does not contribute to it – but, in contrast, jeopardizes these goals 
under realistic conditions.4 
The FCP as further instance able to include public interests into merger pro-
ceedings, can also intervene in merger cases on grounds of purely competi-
tion-related aspects, for instance, market delineation (inter alia, Mair & 
Stifter 2015, 2016; Mair et al. 2017). The public interests the prosecutor has 
to represent according to the law are not defined in detail but seem to 
mostly not coincide with our definition of truly non-market aspects that 
cannot be reached (better) through competition.  
 
                                                          
4  There may be a case for a stricter competition policy towards media markets than towards other 
markets. However, this would be part of the competition rules and their regular enforcement. 
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(ii) Transparency: 
The regulation of media mergers included in Austrian competition law and 
the proceedings in such cases seem to be relatively transparent, whereas the 
tasks of the FCP are less clear and considerably open for interpretation by 
the respective individual prosecutor. This may be due to the fact that the 
“public interests” he shall represent in front of the Higher Regional Court of 
Vienna are not defined by law and, thus, may be interpreted in a broad way. 
Historically, the FCP was set up to give politicians the opportunity to inter-
vene in antitrust proceedings. In this way the institution FCP potentially 
strengthens the transparency of antitrust proceedings and the independence 
of the Austrian competition agency (Beirat für Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen 
2010). Nevertheless, due to the considerable scope for interpretation of pub-
lic interest, it depends on the individual acting as the FCP whether it weak-
ens or even strengthens the protection of competition. 
According to his activity reports of the last years, the current FCP, Alfred 
Mair, seems to interpret his tasks mostly as the protection of consumer wel-
fare – which can clearly be seen as a public interest in general, but, at the 
same time, is also the goal of competition policy itself (i.e. achieving social 
welfare through consumer welfare). As such, it represents no additional and 
no non-market public interest. The activity reports show a variety of interfer-
ences of the FCP in several merger cases – in the media sector and others. 
However, we did not find any case, where the FCP intervened because of tru-
ly non-market aspects; he expressed himself in several proceedings as a rep-
resentative of the public interest by means of corresponding statements 
(Mair & Stifter 2015, 2016; Mair et al. 2017). How exactly that was done and 
the specific public interest reasons of his interventions are not described in 
the activity reports. Altogether, the institution FCP lacks transparency, not 
just in terms of the reasons to intervene, but also in terms of actual tasks – 
both due to the lack of more specific definitions included in competition law 
or guidelines and the considerable scope of interpretation by the respective 
prosecutor. That the interpretation of public interest interventions into com-
petition policy proceedings appear to depend on the individual acting as the 
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FCP symbolizes significant intransparency and legal uncertainty across ap-
pointment periods. While the incumbent officeholder acts in a procompeti-
tive and modest way, things may look very different when another individual 
takes this office. 
 
(iii) Usage: 
As the activity reports show, the FCP intervenes in several cases per year – 
mostly with the aim of improving the respective market delineation and, 
therefore, preventing or containing anticompetitive effects of mergers. In 
2017, he was also active in one merger in the TV sector, where he interfered 
to implement comprehensive behavioural remedies to especially ensure the 
diversity of news reporting (Mair & Stifter 2015, 2016; Mair et al. 2017). Be-
sides this combination of the two public interest consideration possibilities 
in one case, real non-market public interest cases are rare.  
 
(iv) Success/Instrumentality: 
There are positive effects achieved through the FCP – mostly regarding the 
protection of competition. Due to the rare intervention on non-market pub-
lic interest grounds, potential effects in this regard are difficult to analyse 
and assess. Nevertheless, the separate rules for media mergers seem to 
cause the desired positive effects on overall welfare in terms of the public in-
terest in media plurality. After the 2017 Pro7 Sat1 Puls 4/ATV merger, com-
prehensive news media coverage could be preserved through behavioural 
remedies (Mair et al. 2017). Nevertheless, since it required post-merger rem-
edies to safeguard a media plurality that existed pre-merger, it is difficult to 
understand why a prohibition of the merger – protecting both plurality and 
competition – would not have been the superior solution. Obviously, intensi-
ty of competition and public interest target achievement were not a trade-
off here.  
14 
 
(v) Overall Evaluation:         
The overall assessment of the public interest considerations included in Aus-
trian competition policy displays room for reform. Whereas the incentives of 
special rules regarding mergers in the media sector are understandable, the 
objective could be achieved with a stricter competition policy as there is no 
apparent trade-off between the public interest competitive markets and the 
public interest media plurality. Additionally, the institution FCP is much too 
vague with respect to the types of public interest considerations. A clearer 
definition of tasks and especially relevant public interest aspects that the FCP 
shall preserve should be provided in order to improve transparency, legal 
certainty, the achievement of targets and, above all, to effectively represent 
non-market public interests. The arbitrariness of the public interest interpre-
tation seems to be the most relevant problem with the current institutional 
settings, allocating considerable interpretation scope to and, thus, sensitively 
relying on the individual FCP. While the incumbent officeholder acts restric-
tive with respect to ostensible public interests, which are actually driven by 
political and vested interests, another individual in office may considerably 
harm the public interest in protecting competition by a loose and lobbyism-
friendly “public” interest interpretation.5 Thus, a narrow definition of non-
market public interests according to our definition (see section 1) is impera-
tive. 
 
2.2 Public Interest Considerations in French Merger Control 
The French Minister of Economic Affairs can overrule a decision of the French Com-
petition Authority (Autorité de la Concurrence, FCA) regarding a merger if there are 
reasons that are linked to industrial development, business competitiveness in 
terms of international competition and/or creation and preservation of employment 
(Autorité de la Concurrence 2018a). There are two possible starting points for the 
Minister to intervene in a FCA-merger case on public interest grounds: after the 
                                                          
5  As the analysis of the other merger control regimes in the following reveals, this type of abuse is 
far more common and more damaging than to restrict public interest to the protection of com-
petition. 
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FCAs clearing of a Phase I merger review, the Minister can ask the FCA to open a 
Phase II in-depth investigation. The second possibility occurs after the FCAs decision 
in a Phase II investigation; the Minister can then overrule this decision because of 
the mentioned public interest aspects. Therefore, he has the power to prohibit a 
pro-competitive merger or to allow an anticompetitive merger on public interest 
grounds (Article L. 430 - 7 - 1 Code de Commerce).  
The analysis of the French merger control regime in terms of public interest consid-
erations shows following results: 
(i) Non-Market Public Interests: 
The three mentioned potential public interest reasons do not trade-off with 
market competition and, thus, do not match our definition of non-market 
public interests. All of them are linked to macroeconomic effects, which can 
be reached better through competitive markets than through anticompeti-
tive, market-power-creating mergers. They do not stand in conflict with the 
protection of competition as the general goal of merger control and compe-
tition policy. In particular the preservation of employment is highly unlikely 
to be achieved by combination of companies since mergers lead to the reap-
ing of synergy effects which implies a reduction of workforce (inter alia, Seth 
1990; Conyon et al. 2002; Gugler & Yurtoglu 2004; Mukherjee et al. 2004; 
Margolis 2006; Chirita 2016) and an increase on involuntary unemployment 
(Budzinski & Kretschmer 2016). Furthermore, mergers increase market power 
on labour markets, leading to worse conditions for employees (Autor et al. 
2017; Naidu et al. 2018). Also, international competitiveness is actually dy-
namically harmed if domestic competition intensity decreases as a conse-
quence of anticompetitive concentration. In the course of time, firms who 
do not have to compete on their home markets become less fit for interna-
tional competition. 
 
(ii) Transparency:  
While the public interests are at least explicitly stated in the law, their formu-
lation remains rather broad. This may lead to uncertainty for merging com-
panies in terms of the applicability of the instrument/reasons to their specific 
16 
 
case. On the other hand, this broad formulation and missing specific defini-
tion or delimitation of e.g. positive effects on the industrial development 
may also lead to exploitation by the companies. Such open formulations are 
prone to lobbyism and could be utilized by the companies to maximize their 
individual profits under the guise of public interests.  
The specifications for the procedure are regulated in terms which increase 
transparency and legal certainty for all parties potentially involved. Neverthe-
less, the instrument was used rarely so far, thus, experience is small.  
 
(iii) Usage:  
The minister’s right to re-examine a merger decision of the FCA was imple-
mented in French merger control in 2008 with the advent of the FCA. Since 
that, it was used by the respective minister only once in the 2018 
Agripole/Cofigeo case (Autorité de la Concurrence 2018b), where the minis-
ter used his power to clear the merger without remedies (that were imposed 
by the FCA, who cleared the merger under conditions) for reasons of job se-
curity (Dentons 2018).  
 
(iv) Success/Instrumentality:  
In the first case of this kind in French merger control, the remedies drawn by 
the FCA raised concerns in the Minister of Economic Affairs regarding the 
potential impact of the remedies on labour and industrial development. 
Therefore, he induced a “Phase III” investigation after which he overruled 
the FCA’s decision by allowing the merger to take place without any reme-
dies (Renner & Kupka 2018). If, in fact, these remedies would have had a 
negative impact on the job situation or the industrial development of the 
firm and/or the French overall economy remains unclear. However, mergers 
in general tend to have negative effects on the number of jobs in the 
merged company, due to synergy effects, as well as on labour standards (see 
references above). Another questionable point is if the development of one 
single company should be put on one level with the development of the 
overall economy. It is at least controversial if the job situation and economic 
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development of a single firm can really be of general public interest. Overall, 
there is no discernible conflict between the objective of preserving jobs and 
the objective of protecting competition. Therefore, the anticompetitive mer-
ger (now without remedies) is not likely to help achieving the goal of job 
preservation.  
 
(v) Overall Evaluation: 
The fact that the “evocation” power of the French Minister of Economic Af-
fairs is not based on clearly defined public interest reasons that cannot be 
(better) reached through competitive markets and the rare usage of the in-
strument overall indicate that there is in fact no real need for it in the mer-
ger control regime – at least in the current form, which only covers econom-
ic aspects. Even after the first case of this kind in the last year, it is unclear if 
the instrument will be used more regularly now for instance due to the addi-
tional costs of a “Phase III” investigation. 
 
2.3 Public Interest Considerations in UK Merger Control  
Public interests in the current form are a part of the UK merger control since the 
2002 Enterprise Act. There are several possibilities to raise specified public interest 
concerns to the Government: (a) the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & In-
dustrial Strategy can intervene in respective merger cases on grounds of national 
security and financial stability of the UK financial system, and (b) the Secretary of 
State for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport can intervene in merger cases on grounds 
of media quality, plurality, and standards. It is also possible for the respective Sec-
retary of State to intervene because of additional public interest considerations. 
These additional considerations can be implemented into section 58 of the 2002 
Enterprise Act after the order to do so is approved by the two Houses of Parliament 
(as it happened in 2008, during the financial crisis, with the reason regarding fi-
nancial stability). In so-called special public interest cases (c), mergers that do not 
meet the common thresholds for merger investigations may still be investigated 
solely on public interest grounds. These special ruling applies to mergers involving 
government contractors holding confidential information regarding the country’s 
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defence and certain mergers in the media sector (Chisholm & Jung 2014; Cleary 
Gottlieb 2018; Mor 2018).  
The proceedings of a public interest merger case are not strictly and transparently 
divided into a “competition-analysis part” and a “further public interests part”. If 
the above-mentioned public interest considerations are potentially relevant for the 
case, the respective Secretary of State may issue a public interest considerations 
notice (PIIN). After this issue, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) exam-
ines the case in terms of competition and non-competition aspects at the same 
time including third party views (Phase 1). If there were in fact important public 
interest aspects found in Phase 1, the CMA initiates Phase 2 where additional re-
ports are provided to the Secretary of State. The Secretary eventually is the one re-
sponsible for the decision whether or not he or she permits or allows the merger 
based on public interest considerations (Competition and Markets Authority 2014).  
The results of our analysis based on the mentioned five questions are as follows: 
(i) Non-Market Public Interests: 
The potential public interest aspects justifying interventions of politics are 
mostly not non-market and could potentially be achieved (better) through 
competitive markets. Only a potential threat to national security could justify 
an intervention of the Government on grounds of real public interests. Fi-
nancial stability represents a more controversial case. In the short-run, bank 
mergers may be necessary to safeguard financial stability during a financial 
crisis, whereas, in the long-run, increased market concentration in the finan-
cial sector also increases the vulnerability of the system to future crisis (inter 
alia, Akins et al. 2016; Noman et al. 2017; Goetz 2018; Kim 2018). 
 
(ii) Transparency: 
The rules regarding public interest implementation in this respective merger 
control are transparent and the proceedings are predefined. Nevertheless, 
due to the unclear potential reasons and the possibility to include new pub-
lic interest reasons at any time, the overall assessment of the transparency 
and legal certainty through the procedure is rather negative. The possibility 
of exploitation of the instrument by companies seems to exist.  
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(iii) Usage: 
The possibility of including public interest considerations into UK merger 
control cases was used regularly in the past. There were three cases of media 
mergers (the 2007 BSkyB/ITV case, the 2010 News Corporation/BSkyB case, 
and the 2017 Hytera/Sepura case), and one merger case that has been as-
sessed for its potential impact on financial stability. The Lloyds-TSB/HBOS 
merger was also the reason to include the public interest of stability of the 
UK financial system in law during the 2008 financial crisis (Smith 2008). The 
public interest of national security was used in six cases, showing the im-
portant role of this reasoning in UK merger control. Thus, the merger rules 
(including the above mentioned thresholds for special public interest cases) 
regarding the Government`s power to scrutinise mergers and takeovers that 
may raise national security concerns have been updated in 2018. These new 
rules especially apply to tech firms developing military technology and shall 
keep the countries’ openness to trade and investment, while not risking na-
tional security (UK Government 2018).  
 
(iv) Success/Instrumentality: 
All of the merger cases in the financial and the media sector raised contro-
versial discussions on their actual positive effects on public interests after-
wards (Graham 2013, BBC 2018). As mentioned above, the issues are either 
controversial or do not represent non-market public interests according to 
our definition. Therefore, we conclude that in fact real public interest was 
not protected in these cases. Without an in-depth ex-post evaluation of the 
other cases in the defence sector and their results, a clear statement on the 
actual protection of public interests in these cases is difficult to derive. Nev-
ertheless, in these cases actual public interests, which potentially stood in 
conflict with the goal of protecting market competition, were taken into ac-
count and could at least potentially have overweighed the public interest of 
safeguarding competition. 
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(v) Overall Evaluation: 
Since there is only one actual public interest aspect included in UK merger 
control – national security – the overall assessment of the instrument in its 
current form is rather negative. As in the other merger control regimes, the 
reasons justifying political intervention in merger cases because of potential-
ly threatened public interests should be revised in terms of including only 
public interests that cannot be achieved through competition. The develop-
ment of the UK merger rules concerning cases that potentially hold a threat 
to national security can be evaluated as positive. 
 
3. The Special Case of “Ministererlaubnis” in German Merger Control  
As a case study for an ex-post analysis of the actual effects of public interest con-
siderations in merger control, we utilize the example of German merger control and 
the so-called ministerial approval or “Ministererlaubnis”. In German merger control, 
competition and market analysis are meant to be strictly separated from further 
(e.g. public interest) aspects. The German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, 
FCO) prohibits a merger if it would significantly impede effective competition (§36 
(1) GWB) – this decision is made solely based on competition aspects. After the 
FCO’s decision, the companies involved can apply for a ministerial approval. This 
approval can be granted if, in the individual case under consideration, the competi-
tion restrictions resulting from the merger which were determined by the FCO are 
outweighed by (i) macroeconomic advantages, (ii) an overwhelming public interest 
and/or (iii) the strengthening of the international competitiveness of the compa-
nies. Prior to the decision, an opinion from the Monopolies Commission (MC)6 must 
be obtained, stating whether the reasons for the exception are reasonable and like-
ly to be achieved through the anticompetitive merger. The Federal Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs decides upon the approval decision and he may deviate from the 
MC’s advice. An approval must not be granted, however, if the anticompetitive ef-
fects of the concentration in question would jeopardize the overall market econo-
                                                          
6  The MC is an independent advisory body that provides statutory (e.g., sector inquiries) and spe-
cial opinions (e.g., prior to a ministerial approval) on competition policy, competition law and 
regulation issues and advises the government and other legislatures in these areas 
(Monopolkommission 2019).  
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my (§42 (1) GWB). In order to safeguard and support the public interest reasons, 
remedies may be combined with the permission (§42 (2) GWB). Overall, the deci-
sion of the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs is solely based on the three men-
tioned aspects and explicitly not a repeal of the decision of the FCO.  
Since its implementation in the early 1970s, 23 applications for a ministerial ap-
proval were submitted to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. Nine of them 
were granted (with or without conditions), six were rejected, seven were with-
drawn by the companies during the procedure, and one is still waiting for its deci-
sion at the time of writing (Budzinski & Stöhr 2019a). Applications were made by 
companies from different sectors, like energy, media, engineering, and hospitals 
(BMWi 2016a). Some “trends” are visible: from four applications in the energy sec-
tor, three were granted (all against the recommendation of the MC); in the sector 
of agricultural production, all three applications were rejected (in line with the rec-
ommendations of the MC); and in the automotive sector, both applications were 
withdrawn, presumably because of low prospects of success. An overall remarkable 
aspect is that the Federal Minister decided against the explicit recommendation of 
the MC in some of the approval cases – but in none of the rejection cases. The 
members of the MC recommended a ministerial approval only four times, whereas 
the Federal Minister decided more than twice as many cases in favour of the com-
panies. This may indicate how the instrument can be (ab)used to enforce particular 
vested/political interests.  
The pros and especially the cons of this instrument have been subject to controver-
sial academic discussion (inter alia, Lenel 1972; Gröner & Köhler 1979; Krakowski 
1989; Roth & Voigtländer 2002; Deutscher Bundestag 2016; Bien 2016; Podszun 
2016, 2017; Pomana & Nahrmann 2016; Budzinski & Stöhr 2019b). Stöhr & 
Budzinski (2019) add to this discussion by analysing the actual effects of the nine 
cases where the ministerial approval was granted and by evaluating ex-post wheth-
er the goals for the approvals were actually achieved. Table 2 presents an overview 
on the approved cases, including the recommendation of the MC and the reasons 
that caused the approval (with or without conditions) by the Federal Minister. 
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Table 2: Cases of Granted Ministerial Approval  
Case (Year) - Sector Recommendation 
MC 
Reason for approval 
VEBA/Gelsenberg (1974) 
– Energy  
Do not approve  Securing energy supply 
(approved) 
Babcock/Artos (1976)  
– Mechanical Engineer-
ing  
Do not approve Workplace security  
(approved under conditions) 
Thyssen/Hüller-Hille 
(1977) 
– Mechanical Engineer-
ing  
Approve under condi-
tions 
Workplace security for tech-
nically high-skilled teams 
(securing know-how) 
(approved under conditions) 
VEBA/BP (1978/79)  
– Energy  
Do not approve Securing energy supply 
(approved under conditions) 
IBH/WIBAU (1981)  
– Mechanical Engineer-
ing  
Approve Workplace security  
(approved) 
Daimler-Benz/MBB 
(1989) 
– Aerospace  
Approve under condi-
tions  
Privatization of Airbus (risks 
and management) and pre-
vention of market monopoli-
zation in favour of Boeing   
(approved under conditions) 
E.ON/Ruhrgas (2002)  
– Energy  
Do not approve  Securing low-cost energy 
supply 
(approved under conditions) 
Uniklinik Greifswald/KKH 
Wolgast (2007/08)  
– Hospital  
Approve  Securing status as University 
Clinic and research in the 
field of Community Medicine 
(approved) 
EDEKA/Kaiser’s Tengel-
mann (2015/16)  
– Food Retail  
Do not approve  Workplace security in terms 
of quality and quantity  
(approved under conditions) 
Sources: BMWi 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1989, 2002, 2009, 2016b. 
 
Table 2 shows that the reasons leading to a ministerial approval are various and not 
always strictly non-market as we defined them in section 1. According to our defi-
nition of public interests, only the case of Uniklinik Greifswald/KKH Wolgast is 
based on aspects that cannot be achieved through competition. Other cases only 
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partly include such aspects – for example, the quality of jobs in EDEKA/Kaiser’s Ten-
gelmann or the security of know-how regarding working teams in Thyssen/Hüller-
Hille.  
The overview also shows that some “groups” of reasons are more successful in 
terms of receiving an approval than others. Interestingly, these are mostly reasons 
that are formulated in a rather vague way and, thus, tend to be challenging in ex-
post analysis. This may be due to the characteristics of public interest considera-
tions in general or deliberately designed in order to make accountability for deci-
sions more difficult. Nevertheless, the ex-post effects analysis shows mostly nega-
tive results, i.e. the ministerial approvals rarely achieved its own goals (only in one 
case completely; see table 3). This is particularly true for “public interest” consider-
ations mixing in economic- and competition-related aspects, whereas the picture 
looks somewhat more positive for cases of truly non-market public interest reason-
ing. Table 3 gives an overview of the cases and states if the expected public interest 
effects of the anticompetitive merger actually occurred and if, in fact, they were 
accomplished through the respective merger. For that, we combine the three cases 
in the energy sector, where nearly the same reasoning was used in the single cases 
and only one particular market is relevant for the ex-post analysis.  
 
Table 3: Effects of Ministerial-approved Mergers 
Case Reason Effect oc-
curred? 
Caused by 
merger? 
Energy Cases Security of energy supply  Yes No 
Reasonably-priced energy 
supply  
No - 
Babcock/Artos  Workplace security   No -  
Thyssen/Hüller-
Hille 
Workplace security for tech-
nically high-skilled teams 
(securing know-how) 
Rather Yes Rather Yes  
IBH/WIBAU Workplace security No - 
Daimler-
Benz/MBB 
Privatization  Rather No - 
Lowering of federal subsi-
dies  
Rather No - 
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Increasing competitive-
ness/competition  
Yes Yes  
Uniklinik 
Greifswald/KKH 
Wolgast 
Securing status as university 
hospital 
Yes Yes  
Securing Community Medi-
cine research 
Yes Yes  
EDEKA/Kaiser’s 
Tengelmann 
Workplace security in terms 
of quality (KT) 
Yes No 
Workplace security in terms 
of quantity (KT) 
No -  
Source: translated from Stöhr & Budzinski 2019. 
 
Security of jobs in terms of quantity is often used as a public interest concern. 
However, as mentioned before, empirical evidence shows that mergers lead to 
overall less jobs and negative labour market effects (see references in section 2.2), 
whereas competition has a positive impact on the development of employment. 
Our analysis also shows that this is true for the respective ministerial approval cases 
– there are slight indications for positive effects of mergers on workplace security in 
only one case. In the case Edeka/Kaiser’s Tengelmann, the (very specifically defined) 
“quality” of jobs was formally kept but only through special conditions coming 
with the approval. The merger itself has had negative effects on the overall job sit-
uation – jobs were already cut shortly after the ministerial approval.   
The security of reasonable-priced energy supply was used as a potential positive 
effect of the three merger cases in the energy sector. By comparing energy price 
developments in different European countries and checking for potential blackouts 
we come to the conclusion, that there were no such blackouts and the develop-
ment of energy pricing in Germany was not particularly positive in terms of price 
decreases or lower price increases compared to neighboring countries.   
Only the hospital case can be seen as a success in terms of reaching public interest 
goals through an anticompetitive merger.7 In all other cases, the occurrence of the 
positive effects that were the reasons for the approvals cannot be verified ex-post.  
                                                          
7  This specific hospital merger was necessary to preserve the status as a university hospital, and, 
therefore, the education of young doctors in the region as well as the existence of the unique re-
search area “Community Medicine”. In Germany, there are specific regulations and requirements 
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Our case study shows that even in such an established public interest legislation, 
where competition-related and non-competition aspects are strictly separated and 
the instrument is implemented in competition law, positive public interest effects 
occur only in few cases and are in even fewer cases the result of the approved anti-
competitive merger. Therefore, we conclude that the instrument of a ministerial 
approval in its current form does not represent a beneficial part of the German 
competition policy – and should definitely not be extended to the European level. 
Our ex-post analysis shows that the instrument does not fulfil its duties – in most 
cases, the predicted positive public interest effects potentially coming from the 
merger were not capable of outweighing the negative effects on competition. 
Thus, the instrument must undergo significant reforms (if it is not abolished alto-
gether). There are several possibilities for these reforms: e.g. changing the possible 
reasons for an approval to strictly non-market public interests, or changing the de-
cision body (Budzinski & Stöhr 2019b). Without such a reform, the instrument can-
not be seen as a positive example for including public interest considerations into 
competition policy.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks: Economic Justification of Public Interest Considera-
tions in Merger Control?  
Table 4 gives an overview of the results of our analysis (in addition to table 3). The 
overall evaluation of the differently designed instruments in all four jurisdictions 
tends to be rather negative – especially because of the potential public interests 
that may justify an intervention. These reasons are predominantly not non-market 
goals in a strict sense, which cannot be reached through competition but for which 
competition represents a potential impediment (trade-off between effective com-
petition and public interest). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for university hospitals: in order to ensure the quality of the education of young doctors, university hospi-
tals must minimum thresholds of case numbers of specific treatments (in particular types of surgery). Only 
due to the merger (increasing the number of beds and treatments), the university hospital of Greifswald could 
maintain meeting these thresholds in the face of a shrinking population. 
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Table 4: Analysis Results for Exemplary Merger Control Regimes  
 French Mer-
ger Control 
Austrian 
Merger 
Control 
UK Merger 
Control 
German 
Merger 
Control 
Non-Market Public In-
terests? 
No Partly Partly Partly  
Transparency of Pro-
cedure 
- Proceedings 
yes 
- Reasons no 
- Institution 
of Federal 
Cartel Pros-
ecutor no 
- Regulation 
of media 
mergers yes  
- Proceed-
ings yes 
- Reasons no 
- Proceed-
ings yes 
- Reasons no 
Usage of Instrument Once  Rare Regularly Rare  
Success/Instrumentality 
of  Instrument to reach 
public interest goals 
Consequences 
are not yet 
foreseeable, 
but rather no 
Rather no Partly  Partly  
Overall Evaluation  of 
Instrument 
Rather nega-
tive  
Rather neg-
ative 
Rather nega-
tive 
Rather nega-
tive 
 
All the current concepts suffer from descriptions or definitions of public interest 
that are too broad and not focused on non-market public interests, i.e. such public 
interests that are better achieved through market power than through effective 
competition and, thus, stand in a trade-off relation to the public interest of pro-
tecting competition. This offers scope for injecting vested interests of politicians, 
companies and other powerful lobbies into the decision process in the guise of os-
tensible “public” interest. At the end of the day, this harms social welfare without 
serving any real public interest. Consequently, the answer to our first research 
question, are the public interests stipulated in the respective competition laws are 
non-market in nature, is clearly: no, since none of the regimes limits itself to non-
market public interests. Further deficiencies include that none of the analysed re-
gimes and cases includes checks whether the market power resulting from the 
permitted anticompetitive mergers is instrumental to achieve the stated public in-
terest goals. Given these results, it is not surprising that the empirical record of past 
public interest interventions into merger control is mixed at best from an ex-post 
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perspective, which represents the answer to our second research question. For 
Germany, where we have the largest data-set of respective interventions, the de-
sired public interest effects were (probably) achieved only in a minority of cases and 
in even fewer cases the market power of the allowed anticompetitive merger was 
instrumental in achieving the desired public interests. And there is no indication 
that the records for other regimes are likely to look any better. Thus, altogether, 
the public interest considerations in the current regimes are deficient and contrib-
ute neither to welfare nor to the interests of the public. Calls for extending provi-
sions like these either in scope (even broader) or to the European level – like from 
the French-German manifesto – cannot be supported by academic analysis. It must 
be expected to be detrimental to social welfare without serving any real public in-
terest. Only vested interests and the forces of lobbyism are likely to benefit from 
such a reform. 
Quite in contrast to the calls for an extension, a beneficial reform must narrow and 
focus the scope for public interest considerations and provide institutional checks 
and balances against abuses. First and foremost, only non-market public interest 
can provide a ground for overriding competition-focused merger control decisions. 
In order to safeguard this, we propose a four-step test (Budzinski & Stöhr 2019b): 
a. Identification of a social goal that is demonstrably in the interest of the gen-
eral public. 
b. Evidence of a trade-off between this public goal and effective competition.  
c. Proof that this goal is better achieved by market power than by the protec-
tion of the competition process.  
d. Balancing the welfare costs of the considerable weakening of effective com-
petition with the benefits of better fulfilment of the social goal, including 
proof that no alternative, "milder" instruments exist that would enable an 
equivalent achievement of the social goal. 
The enforcement of this test must be given in the hands of an independent deci-
sion-making body like a law court. In order to maintain transparency and in order 
to protect the competition authority from political pressure, it should be strictly 
separated from the competition policy analysis and decision. If a competent au-
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thority (for instance, a government unit or a specialised authority) wants to get a 
merger control decision overruled on public interest grounds, it needs to seek per-
mission of an anticompetitive merger or prohibition of a procompetitive merger in 
front of the court. The burden of proof with respect to all four steps must be allo-
cated to the party seeking the overturning of the merger control decision on public 
interests grounds (Budzinski & Stöhr 2019b).  
In the aftermath of the prohibited Siemens/Alstom merger, the latest controversy 
around public interest considerations in EU merger control focuses on promoting 
National or European Champions. German and French politicians are calling for “a 
more ambitious European industrial strategy with clear objectives for 2030” (BMWi 
2019: 1) including, besides other things, changes in European merger guidelines 
and better possibilities to subsidize European companies to promote their interna-
tional competitiveness (BMWi 2019: 4). This implies that there would be a public 
interest for generating and/or supporting European Champions and that this repre-
sents a trade-off with effective domestic competition. The underlying logic would 
be that companies with domestic market power can use the supracompetitive rents 
from domestic markets (which are yielded on the expense of customers and socie-
ty) to increase their international competitiveness and, thus, reap higher rents from 
foreign markets that overcompensate the domestic welfare losses. However, there 
is vast theoretical and empirical evidence that companies protected from domestic 
competition tend to concentrate on exploiting their market power to the detriment 
of consumers and society as well as on lobbying for and extending non-competitive 
pensions and privileges (rent-seeking instead of competitiveness) – ultimately also 
to the detriment of their international competitiveness (inter alia, Jenny & Neven 
2019, Motta et al. 2019, Zettelmeyer 2019). Thus, there is no non-market public 
interest in protecting single industries or companies from (national or international) 
competition. An introduction of such “fake” public interest considerations into Eu-
ropean competition law would be the wrong way for the new Commission to start 
into their legislation period.  
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